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In her autobiography, Charlotte Perkins Gilman interjected into an otherwise 
commonplace account of adolescence a revelation that she believed foretold the 
course of an uncommon career: 
The one real study which did appeal to me, deeply, was 
Physics, then called Natural Philosophy. Here was Law, at last; 
not authority, not records of questionable truth or solemn 
tradition, but laws that could be counted on and Proved. That 
was my delight, to know surely. 
Whether or not Gilman truly was stirred by this emotion as she performed 
experiments in high school physical science, an examination of her mature 
writings reveals that she adjudged intellectual certainty a lofty—and attainable— 
goal. By wiring this ambition into her temperment and choosing "Physics" as a 
model for the knowledge she expected to acquire while pursuing it, Gilman 
naturalized a lifelong commitment to positivist science. She could in good faith 
make the "Natural Philosophy" comparison because she believed that social 
science had recently acquired the capacity for generating knowledge as reliable 
as the facts of hard science. By "Law" she meant the pattern of necessity created 
when Darwinian insights were set to work within the domain of sociology. Her 
desire to "know surely" was that of the reform-minded intellectual convinced that 
this operation made it possible, as she put it, to see the "sorrows and perplexities" 
of life as "but the natural results of natural causes." The clear vision of the social 
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scientist who, having ascertained "the causes" could "do much to remove them," 
thereby displaced the eternal puzzlement of "philosopher and moralist."1 
Gilman's determination to follow the dictates of conscience along a scien-
tific rather than religious path represented, in part, an assertion of independence 
from a family that contained several of New England's most notorious moralists. 
The Beechers from Lyman on had played active roles in the transformation of 
New England Calvinism into a less doctrinal, more reform-minded religion, but 
none of the more famous would have abided Charlotte's thoroughly secular 
declaration of faith.2 By flaunting so brazenly the mantle of positivist science, 
Gilman also acted her part in a generational drama. As Dorothy Ross has pointed 
out, the eruption in the last quarter of the nineteenth century of "European"-style 
class conflict in a land where, by Protestant and republican expectations alike, 
such things were not supposed to happen unsettled those of Gilman's peers who 
presumed to discharge intellectual duties. These intellectuals, many with evan-
gelical backgrounds, sought to repair the damage done to the national self-image 
with tools borrowed from the positivist tradition. Old liberals and new—from 
William Graham Sumner to Lester Ward, the thinker from whom Gilman claimed 
to have learned the most—couched their various political prescriptions in the 
language of Mill, Comte, and, especially, Spencer, the social thinker most in step, 
as they saw it, with Darwin's revolution in biology. American radicals, eager to 
redeem what by the end of the century were adjudged the setbacks of the 1890s, 
set about synchronizing American theory with another variety of positivism—the 
"Darwinized" Marxism of the Second Socialist International. All these figures, 
from aggrieved patriots to committed anticapitalists, expected to trade profitably 
on the certainty to which they figured their devotion to science entitled them.3 
I argue in this essay that Gilman's desire to "know surely," however 
delightful to her, ultimately proved her undoing. The tragedy of her career is that 
the mode of analysis she chose to fulfill this ambition was unserviceable for the 
work she most wanted to accomplish. A positivist sociology provided powerful 
arguments for discrediting the thinking and social arrangements that perpetuated 
gender inequality, but made their supercession seem the inevitable outcome of an 
automatic process. With nature so solidly on the side of reform, the reformer was 
left with little to do but reveal to the as yet uninformed where this lawful process 
was taking them. After making the realm of the familiar so plainly unnatural, 
Gilman had difficulty explaining why ordinary women felt more at home there 
than in the brave new world that she saw social evolution preparing for them. In 
a wonderfully revealing moment in Women and Economics (1898), she ran 
abruptly into these conundrums but quickly recovered, quieting the misgivings 
that this encounter provoked with a forced display of scientific bravado. She 
thereby guaranteed that her most troublesome political problems—finding a role 
for conscious agency in a deterministic analysis, selling a scientistic vision of 
liberation to those who seemed unaware of their oppresssion—would continually 
resurface, unmastered and full of mischief, in the rest of the text. 
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Figure 1: Photo of Charlotte Perkins Gilman. (Photo courtesy of Bryn 
Mawr College Library, The C. C. Catt Albums.) 
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Gilman' s only compelling solution to the difficulties she faced as sociologist 
and feminist was finally to create a world of her own. Only in the Utopian novel 
Herland (1915) does she envision a full transcendence of the sorrows and 
perplexities that most concerned her. Of course, Gilman did not, by turning to 
Utopian fiction, distinguish herself from radical compatriots. Populists like 
Ignatius Donnelly and socialists from Edward Bellamy to Jack London all took 
advantage of that genre's usefulness as a stage for dramatizing ideas that, 
broached in the context of the actually existing, appeared insufficiently plausible 
to move as many adherents as were required to effect radical change.4 In each of 
these cases, however, the ideas set in motion by the Utopian author were the same 
ones he advocated in real life. A close reading of Women and Economics and 
Herland reveals, by contrast, a sharp disjuncture between Gilman's sociology 
and her Utopian fiction: the science that in the former promises a natural liberation 
assumes in the latter the guise of a menacing alien. Conversely, the scientific point 
of view embraced by the liberated women of Herland resembles a real world 
conception to which Gilman as social scientist remained indifferent. Utopia for 
Gilman was an entirely experimental realm—a place for creating new social 
conditions and for testing new ideas, connected by ironic rather than direct 
juxtapositions with the real. Imaginative writing promised her release not just 
from an oppressive world but also from the analytic machinery she used in her 
sociology to make sense of it. The distinctiveness of her project, in short, resides 
in the disjuncture between the Utopian and the real, the wholly imaginary and the 
all too familiar. 
The difficulty of reconciling the demands of science and politics is a common 
one in any age. By watching closely as Gilman wrestled with it, we gain insight 
into a dilemma that has long bedeviled reform-minded intellectuals. Her example 
also suggests that historians committed to delineating the role gender plays in 
women's intellectual undertakings generally need neither brave the perils of 
tracking a distinctively female point of view nor, having glimpsed the dangers of 
essentialism, take the postmodernist detour around them.5 Rather, we might set 
out to investigate the workings of those additional ideological constraints under 
which women as women operated while addressing, with such conceptual 
materials as were available, the questions that men and women alike deemed 
worthy of attention. From this perspective, Gilman does not so much speak in a 
different voice as carry an extra burden—that of liberating women with weapons 
that were used far more effectively to enforce women's confinement. "Knowing 
surely" precisely as she understood it—through the power of abstract reason— 
was considered in her day a male prerogative. Gilman used positivism to claim 
that right for women, but acquired thereby a kind of knowledge that hovered 
menacingly over the beliefs of the ordinary women she hoped to reach. The 
concrete world of everyday experience—the place where science and politics 
alike must finally touch down if they are to win adherents—thus became for her 
a prison, patrolled on the inside by those whom her favorite abstractions 
construed as feminism's natural constituency.6 
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When Gilman tied feminist prospects to the reputation of science, she was not 
so much doing the work of a pioneer as cultivating anew a field that lately had lain 
fallow. During the mid-nineteenth century, women activists looking for ways to 
break the stranglehold of tradition found much to admire in positivist rationalism. 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton regularly cited Comte to support arguments for social 
cooperation and gender equality. Caroline Dall, as pioneering feminist and co-
founder of the American Social Science Association, personified the union of 
reform politics and engaged social science that marked intellectual life in the two 
decades after the Civil War. By the mid-1880s, however, the proponents of 
reason and science occupied the margins of a reform movement dominated 
increasingly by the revitalized forces of sentimental religion. To the advocates of 
temperance and moral purity, the great majority of them women, rationalism 
looked like atheism, the free discussion of sexuality a tawdry disguise for the open 
promotion of pornography. Such authority as free-thinking rationalists managed 
to retain in a world populated by high-minded evangelists was undermined 
further by the professionalization of social science, which discredited then-
favored methods of truth-seeking. The same forces that made midwifery a crime 
rendered Comte and Spencer passé and, in the process, weakened the link 
feminists had forged between positivist science and political reform. With the 
demise of the ASSA, women became as scarce in the new venues of normal 
science as they were in the delivery rooms of professionalized health care. As 
"objective" science and partisan politics went their separate ways, Jesus became 
more popular than Darwin among those who sought to mobilize women for 
reform.7 
American social science, then, was very much a male preserve at the turn of 
the century, a situation that presented special problems to women engaged during 
these years in efforts to bolster with social scientific arguments the feminist case 
against inequality and oppression. Most vexing perhaps, the conceptual inven-
tory with which male progressives tackled the dilemmas of scientific reform 
looked to feminist intellectuals like a catalog of dangerous propositions. Thorstein 
Veblen, a thinker with whom Gilman is frequently matched, bled a creative 
historical agent from his positivist system by a dextrous finagling with instinct 
theory: the machine process awakened in the consciousness of its designers 
propensities for "workmanship" and a "live and let live" egalitarianism bred in 
the human psyche during a prior period of "savagery." Keenly aware that instinct 
theory played an important role in scientific legitimations of gender inequality, 
Gilman dismissed it, although by doing so she foreswore the use of maneuvers 
like Veblen's for liberating an agent of change from a system of necessary cause 
and effect. Second International socialists disguised Marx as an evolutionary 
positivist so that they might derive from "Marxist" principles a proletariat 
impelled toward revolution by the simple maturation of industrial conditions, but 
in the process obliterated the distinctiveness of women's oppression—the very 
thing Gilman was trying to isolate. The socialist tradition with which Gilman 
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identified was thus Utopian rather than Marxist, a choice that made good feminist 
sense but bore poor analytic fruit. The pragmatists, whose rise to prominence 
coincided with Gilman's, offered release from the essentializing discourse of 
biology-grounded positivism and, in the persons of John Dewey and George 
Herbert Mead, provided crucial support for women seeking admittance into the 
academy. Gilman could hardly be encourged, however, by what resulted when 
Walter Lippmann—who carried the political torch for pragmatism before Dewey 
himself took it up during World War I—turned his attention to "the woman's 
movement." In addition, pragmatists demanded as the price of intellectual 
liberation, the abandonment of the quest for certainty—the touchstone of Gilman's 
intellectual career—and offered as replacement an intersubjective notion of truth, 
a substitute not likely to tempt someone as aware as Gilman of the verdicts 
rendered on the relative capacities of men and women by the reigning community 
of experts.8 
Women and Economics, at once Gilman's most ambitious work of sociology 
and her most successful book, constitutes in this context a sustained effort to 
restore science as the nineteenth century understood it to a position of prominence 
in the women's movement of the twentieth. Her fondness for old-style positivism 
is clear from the opening pages. After making the Darwinian assertion that "the 
human creature is affected by his environment, as is every other living thing," she 
proceeded to delineate three kinds of determining "conditions." The first, a 
"material/geographical environment," flags Gilman's formal allegiance to En-
lightenment materialism but carried little explanatory weight in her substantive 
analyses. The second, the transforming "effects" of an organism's own activity, 
signals her commitment to the Lamarckianism which many social scientists 
continued to defend—none more doggedly than Ward—even after Weissman 
had, to the satisfaction of most practicing biologists at least, debunked the theory 
of acquired characteristics. The environment that Gilman deemed the most 
powerful "modifier of human life," however, was the "social" world. This third 
determining condition, she contended, was alone uniquely human. All three 
environments exerted their power in human societies "through our economic 
necessities," the proposition underlying Gilman's characterization of Women 
and Economics as a "study of the economic relation between men and women as 
a factor in social evolution."9 
After laying this scientific groundwork, Gilman introduced the "peculiar 
economic condition" which, in the rest of the text, served as the primary cause of 
women's oppression: "We are the only animal species in which the female 
depends on the male for food, the only animal species in which the sex-relation 
is also an economic relation." As "the feeder of woman," man becomes "the 
strongest modifying force in her economic condition." The woman is thereby "cut 
off from the direct action of natural selection" and, thereafter, shaped by a 
condition of dependence. Barred from "the ever-growing human impulse to 
create, the power and will to make, to do, to express one's new spirit in new 
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forms," she becomes passive, weak, and incompetent. Finding that she must use 
"sex-distinction" not only, as all creatures do, to attract a mate, but to gain a 
livelihood as well, "she is modifed to sex to an excessive degree." This modifi-
cation, Gilman argues in good Lamarckian fashion, she then transmits to her 
offspring "and so is steadily implanted in the human constitution the morbid 
tendency to excess in this relation, which has acted so universally upon us in all 
ages, in spite of our best efforts to restrain it."10 
Thus far, Gilman has managed to translate into a scientific language the old 
liberal critique of dependency that grounded Seneca Falls feminism and the 
Puritan dread of sensuality that marked all but the free love advocates in the 
nineteenth-century women's movement.11 She thereby reappropriated equal 
rights individualism from those who argued as social Darwinians against women's 
autonomy and reclaimed the moral high ground from those who battled as 
Christians against sexual morbidity. She also inherited a predicament peculiar to 
those who tendered scientific solutions to moral problems: where her evangelical 
peers could openly declare their partisanship in such matters without risking their 
intellectual inheritance, Gilman must disguise her normative judgments. For this 
purpose, she enlisted a "natural/unnatural" distinction which, designed for the 
no-nonsense work of description, did double duty as a standard of moral 
judgment. In her discussion of the "sex-relation," for example, she distinguished 
"two main lines of action." The "gradual orderly development of monogamous 
marriage," because it advanced "the interests of the individual and society," was 
a "natural" development. As such, it was "inevitable in the course of social 
progress, not an artificial condition, enforced by laws of our making." The 
process that created the conditions of women's dependence, by contrast, was 
"unnatural" or "morbid." Our "moral concepts," she deduced from this and like 
examples, "rest primarily on facts"—monogamous marriage is "right" because 
it is the "best form" for "our racial good."12 Gilman thus grounded the judgments 
linking her economic analysis of women's oppression to her political ambition to 
see that oppression ended in a natural law morality wherein facts were always 
"patent" and readily appropriable by a transhistorical moral sense. 
The natural harmony Gilman orchestrated between her political and scien-
tific ideals collapsed all too quickly into a jarring dissonance. In the most poignant 
and fateful passage in the text, she turned to confront the difficulties created by 
entangling a commitment to women's liberation with the mission of positivist 
science: 
The facts stated in the foregoing chapters are familiar and 
undeniable, the argument seems clear; yet the mind reacts 
violently from the conclusions it is forced to admit, and tries to 
find relief in the commonplace conditions of every-day life. 
From this looming phantom of the over-sexed female of genus 
homo we fly back in satisfaction to familiar acquaintances and 
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relatives,—to Mrs. John Smith and Miss Imogene Jones, to 
mothers and sisters and daughters and sweethearts and wives. 
We feel that such a dreadful state of things cannot be true, or 
we should surely have noticed it. We may even perform that 
acrobatic feat so easy to most minds,—admit that the statement 
may be theoretically true, but practically false!13 
Shifting her point of view momentarily from sociological observer to that of 
"familiar" friends and kin, Gilman glimpsed a credibility gap threatening the easy 
relationship just negotiated between scientific theory and common sense. The 
equally "familiar" facts of positivism suddenly became, from this standpoint, 
either repugnant or illusory; the ethical and political agenda she wanted most to 
advance seemed to lose its solid footing in natural science. To visualize the 
"looming phantom" conjured up during Gilman's sociological analysis, one had 
to peer through her Darwinian lens. Certainly, the Victorian women Gilman 
invoked in this moment of doubt could see little of themselves in the image of 
femininity thus projected. 
Having confronted in the world of the ordinary the specter of an irremediable 
discrepancy between the "theoretically true" and the "practically false," Gilman 
immediately sought relief in the realm of theory. To explain why most people 
seemed not to have noticed facts which her science and her ethics designated 
"natural" and "undeniable," she shifted again into a scientific idiom: "Two simple 
laws of brain action are responsible for the difficulty of convincing the human 
race of any large general truths concerning itself." According to the first, "what 
we are used to we do not notice." Habitual practices like the wearing of corsets 
render people insensitive to the most palpable evils. The other mental law asserts 
that "it is easier to personalize than to generalize." Thus "the popular mind" 
moves only with great difficulty from the perception of "individual instances of 
injustice or cruelty" to that of the "conditions which cause" them. How was it that 
some minds, beyond the jurisdiction of the laws of brain action, managed to 
negotiate the difficult path from specific instance to general cause? How, in short, 
did Gilman reconcile the competing claims of deterministic science and con-
scious reform? "Darwinian" logic, in a form Darwin scarcely would have 
recognized, again came to the rescue: "in the course of social evolution there are 
developed individuals so constituted as not to fit existing conditions, but to be 
organically adapted to more advanced conditions." The "heretic, reformer, and 
agitator" see and feel the injustices of "existing conditions" and raise an outcry 
against them. As a result, these "advanced individuals" are invariably persecuted 
by those who have not noticed these conditions. 
But this severe process of elimination developed the kind of 
progressive person known as a martyr; and this remarkable 
sociological law was manifested: that the strength of a current 
social force is increased by the sacrifice of individuals who are 
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willing to die in the effort to promote it. 'The blood of the 
martyrs is the seed of the church.'14 
After devising a psychological justification for the apparent incredibility of 
scientific logic, Gilman here describes a natural scheme for liberating an agent of 
change from the structure of determinism embedded in that justification. The 
antidote to "simple" mental laws working against the recognition of "patent" facts 
and injustices is a "remarkable" sociological law circumscribing the efforts of 
those individuals who defy simple laws and patent injustices. Truly, no one in 
Women and Economics is beyond the reach of one law or another. By subjecting 
everyone to a higher, scientific authority, Gilman silenced the voice that doubted 
the practicality of her own diagnosis of women's oppression. Even as they flee 
in horror and disbelief from the "looming phantom of the over-sexed female of 
the genus homo," Mrs. Smith and Miss Jones contribute to the inexorable forward 
march of human progress. By capturing in analogy the similarities between the 
Darwinian "advanced individuals" and the evangelical "blood of the martyrs" 
arguments, Gilman effected a reconciliation with both her imagined feminist 
constituency and real life friends and kin. In the process she showed how 
free-thinkers and church-goers—positivist science and sentimental religion— 
might work together for a common cause. 
Gilman joined an esteemed group of Darwinian thinkers by choosing this 
particular way of finessing the deterministic implications of her scientific 
convictions. Two decades earlier, William James had made a similar case for 
"great men," arguing that these individuals, like random "variations" in the 
natural, were the social world's agents of novelty and change. E.R.A. Seligman, 
even as he derided James' indifference to social conditions, nonethelesss reserved 
for the "ethical teacher" the same role James filled with his assorted advanced 
individuals—an exhibition of the difficulties that Seligman and his allies created 
for themselves by claiming a Darwinian sanction for their efforts to infuse 
American social science with the spirit of German historicism. Max Eastman, at 
once the most Jamesian of WWI-era radicals and a practitioner of the economic 
interpretation of history promoted at Columbia by Seligman and his more famous 
colleagues in the history department, cast the Industrial Workers of the World as 
"heralds" of the "civilization of the future" whose persecution in the present 
secured, by assuaging the violent impulses motivating their persecutors, the 
"spiritual ease" of the nation. All three thinkers presumed, in James's words, a 
"remarkable parallel... between the facts of social evolution on the one hand, and 
of zoological evolution as expounded by Mr. Darwin on the other."15 
To situate Gilman's vision of progress by calling up for comparison the likes 
of James, Seligman, and Eastman is to confront immediately the political 
liabilities assumed when using biological analogies to explain social develop-
ment. James used the "great man" as "ferment" argument to give Darwinian 
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sanction to his fascination with mystics, saints, and anarchists. Such sympathies 
bolstered his pluralist reputation but hardly constitute a usable politics. Seligman 
was not shy about calling attention to the political implications of his particular 
brand of historicism, but invoked at those moments the beneficence of a market 
economy rather than of ethical teachers. His use of evolutionary language seemed 
better adapted to securing the scientific credentials of an academic than a political 
agenda. Eastman suppressed, in his sole attempt at sustained socialist theorizing, 
the advanced individuals piece of the Darwinian logic that prescribed his practical 
role as champion for a parade of intellectual heroes—in order, Dewey, Lenin, and 
Trotsky. He confessed this purposive omission only after adopting, as Cold 
Warrior, a politics that required neither dissembling on the "great man" question 
nor leading any battles for substantive reform.16 
The ambition to get right with Darwin led all who pursued it into the snares 
of the same conundrum. Whether one was an old or new liberal, a feminist or 
socialist, thinkers who hitched political hopes to this kind of naturalism found 
themselves thereafter with little to do but wait for nature to breed the appropriate 
heroes, much like the positivists of the Second International were forever 
forecasting the spontaneous emergence, from "advanced" industrial conditions, 
of a class conscious proletariat. In Gilman's case, resorting to the "advanced 
individuals" gambit exacerbated the already strained relationship between her 
sociology and her politics: her conviction that such figures, even as they are 
persecuted, nonetheless contribute to human progress obviated the need to 
construct a politics for mobilizing ordinary individuals. Mrs. Smith and Miss 
Jones, when plugged into Gilman's formula for social change, need assume no 
responsibility for consciously seeking their own liberation. 
Gilman's surrender to the temptations of positivist certainty left her in 
possession of a chronic ambivalence about delegating any political tasks to 
human will and intelligence. On the one hand, she was fond of statements like this : 
"The change considered in these pages is not one merely to be prophesied and 
recommended: it is already taking place under the forces of social evolution; and 
only needs to be made clear to our conscious thought, that we may withdraw the 
futile but irritating resistance of our misguided will." While loyal to this logic, 
Gilman belittled the efforts of "promulgators of theories and writers of books," 
a move commonly made by the Darwinian Marxists of her generation. On the 
other hand, her ambition to downplay the role of instinct in human affairs led her 
to assert with equal frequency that as "humanity advances" social evolution 
became a more conscious process. In these passages she popularized ideas 
developed more systematically by Ward. For example: "The human creature 
prospers and progresses not by virtue of his animal instinct, but by the wisdom and 
force of a cultivated intelligence and will, with which to guide his action and to 
control and modify the very instincts which used to govern him."17 
When painting with broad historical strokes, Gilman resolved these appar-
ently contradictory positions by segregating periods of "unconscious" and 
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"conscious" progress and deploying within each the appropriate characteriza-
tion—respectively, misguided obstacle or guiding force—of human will.18 Once 
she entered the present, however, as in the above passages, the contradiction 
between these two kinds of statements again materialized. Even after acknowl-
edging in a Wardian way the fact of consciousness, the author of Women and 
Economics still had found no role for purposive, intelligent action beyond 
"understanding" and "helping" a process that was already moving—and presum-
ably would move, a little more slowly perhaps, without such earthly assistance— 
in a progressive direction. 
Theoretical discrepancies rarely impede the practical activities of even the 
most scientistic reformer, and Gilman was no exception. Throughout her career 
she combined her work as free-lance sociologist with political endeavors pursued 
at a frenetic pace. She contributed as writer and lecturer to Edward Bellamy's 
Nationalist crusade, the American Fabian movement, and the campaign for 
women's suffrage; helped found the Intercollegiate Socialist Society and the 
vanguard feminist organization Heterodoxy; worked at Hull House; and wrote 
every word in the Forerunner, the magazine she put out singlehandedly from 
1909 until 1916. As an activist, Gilman no doubt imagined herself contributing 
to the "conscious progress" theorized in her sociological texts. Unfortunately, her 
theory and practice fused at another level as well. The troublesome reality 
represented in Women and Economics by Mrs. Smith and Miss Jones had its real 
world counterpart in the meager results Gilman saw from her proselytizing. 
Neither the Nationalists nor the American Fabians ever amounted to much and, 
by 1920, she had lost her feminist audience as well. These failures—or, in the case 
of suffrage, hollow victories—must have added to the appeal of the "unconscious 
progress" scenario that coexisted uneasily with Gilman's appeals to "a cultivated 
intelligence and will." Her tireless propagandizing for feminism at a time when 
by her own admission "neither men nor women" desired a change in women's 
status, finally appears more Christian than Darwinian, the dynamics of historical 
advance more a cycle of pious martyrdom than of conscious reform.19 
Like so many Progressive-era intellectuals, Gilman anticipated the future 
with a hope seemingly out of proportion to her prognosis of the present. As her 
case demonstrates, the faith in progress these thinkers exhibited was more an 
ideological than a psychological condition—the intellectual complement of a 
specific political vision rather than a congenital trait shared by an entire, 
"innocent" generation. Gilman thought her political agenda with two concepts: 
"interdependence" and "independence." She used the former to connote the mesh 
of collective, mutually dependent relations characteristic of an industrialized 
society and invoked it to urge the adoption of a politics that, in deference to new 
conditions, subordinated "personal" to "common" interests. Like her Nationalist 
and Fabian comrades and all but the syndicalists in Debs' Socialist Party, she 
defined socialism in these "collectivist" terms. By "independence" Gilman meant 
"that the individual pays for what he gets, works for what he gets, gives to the other 
an equivalent for what the other gives him." If this sounds like it could have been 
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lifted from The Wealth of Nations, there is good reason: no less than Adam Smith, 
Gilman identified this free market condition with freedom generally and opposed 
it to the unnatural "dependence" of women. By translating this old liberal ideal 
into a new industrial language, she manufactured a political component to fit the 
Darwinian analysis of dependence undertaken at the beginning of Women and 
Economics. Once inside this discursive realm, she promptly spied a collective 
agent to replace the "advanced individuals" who occupy the scientific portion of 
the text: it is, she argues at this point, "the increasing army of women wage-earners, 
who are changing the face of the world by their steady advance toward economic 
independence."20 If the achievement of this kind of "independence" was all 
Gilman required to fulfill her socialist ideal, she was surely justified in anticipat-
ing a rosy future. 
These wage-earners, like Mrs. Smith and Miss Jones, did not have to be 
conscious of their revolutionary mission. Even after replacing her imaginary 
audience of individuals with an actually existing collectivity, Gilman still 
entrusted progress to a historical agent that would effect its transformations even 
if the women composing it never read one of her books or attended one of her 
lectures. Indeed, by consigning her feminist agenda to an agent that neither 
sought nor desired changes in women's status, she anticipated in theory the 
isolation that befell the women's movement in the 1920s. The women she 
imagines fleeing from the image of femininity conjured up by her sociology 
would flee in fact from the image projected by post-war feminists, not in "horror 
and disbelief but out of indifference to a movement that continued to define 
liberation in terms that did not touch the deeper causes of oppression. The 
recognition that the entrance into the workforce of women wage-workers, like the 
addition to the electorate of women voters, left intact the conditions that created 
women's "sorrows and perplexities" required an altogether different conception 
of oppression than could be generated by positivist or liberal assumptions. Bound 
as sociologist and socialist to these assumptions, Gilman remained locked within 
the prison of the familiar—the ideological rabbit's hole where the same idea can 
be "theoretically true" and "practically false," self-evident to the positivist 
theorist but incredible to those whom positivist theory casts as liberators. 
Ultimately, Gilman managed an escape from this prison only by breaking her 
commitment to positivism and settling into a worldview of her own design. The 
science that in Women and Economics illuminated the causes of women's 
oppression worked^in Herland, the most successful of her Utopian novels, to 
defeat the cause of women's liberation. Gilman made this point by investing all 
three male protagonists who accidentally stumble upon her exclusively women's 
Utopia with an "interest in science" which, in this world, leads them to defend 
"theories" and other "clear ideas" that obstruct their understanding of Herland 
realities. The women of Herland, while not unscientific, are committed to an 
altogether different conception than clouds the minds of the male intruders: 
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. . . when it came to the simpler and more concrete science, 
wherein the subject matter was at hand and they had but to 
exercise their minds upon it, the results were surprising. They 
had worked out a chemistry, a botany, a physics, with all the 
blends where a science touches an art, or merges into an 
industry, to such fullness of knowledge as made us feel like 
schoolchildren.21 
This, at first glance, seems a curious move for Gilman to make. Here again is 
"physics," but the desire to "know surely" that she associated with real life 
physics is in Herland an outmoded—and male—prejudice. Similarly, Herland 
natural philosophy prescribes not the ascetic search for "Law" proclaimed so 
reverently in her autobiography but a sensuous activity no different in kind from 
artistic or industrial production. This about face appears all the more surprising 
when one recognizes that Gilman performed it to enshrine in Utopia a conception 
of women's science fully consistent with the logic of real world gender ideology. 
The writer of Utopian fiction, whom one would expect to be least constrained by 
the conventions of her culture, authors a perfectly conventional formulation of 
women's scientific work. 
Why does Gilman, who typically defended against great odds a thoroughly 
radical position on questions relating to "woman's nature," negotiate in her own 
imagination a compromise with the view that it was not in woman's nature to 
reason abstractly?22 Simply put, this move resolved the problem of credibility that 
nagged her in Women and Economics—her suspicion that the "familiar" friends 
and kin who constituted the natural constituency for a feminist politics could not 
recognize themselves in the "phantom" conjured up by a naturalist examination 
of women's condition. By inscribing practicality in the heart of Herland science, 
Gilman eliminated the possibility, glimpsed so apprehensively in her sociological 
analysis, that her scientific prescriptions might be "theoretically true" but 
"practically false." Here, in short, was a science with which Mrs. Smith and Miss 
Jones were already intuitively familiar insofar as they were engaged in creating 
the artifacts of ordinary life. To have made this kind of "practical" concession in 
her sociological arguments would have implicated Gilman in confirming male 
expectations about women's intellectual capacities, including the one that deemed 
them unfit for sociology.23 In Utopia, this concession to gender ideology allowed 
her to turn the tables. The scientist from a world where complexity and abstraction 
were deemed at once higher and male faculties—and who could therefore without 
fear of rebuke smile condescendingly at any such "simpler and more concrete 
science"—found himself in Herland rendered childlike by the comparative 
thinness and emptiness of positivist knowledge. Where in Gilman's own world 
the stubborn fact of gender oppression jeopardized the intelligibility of her 
scientific project, the egalitarian conditions of Herland made all but the most 
prosaic scientific practices seem needlessly abstruse. The very connection that in 
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her sociological texts remained tenuous and abstract—between dispassionate 
scientific theory and feminist political practice—assumed in the Utopian novel 
the guise of a concrete relationship between archaic men and advanced women. 
By showing how such relationships were possible, she closed the gap that yawned 
in Women and Economics between the theories of the scientific reformer and the 
common sense notions of her constituency. Her political task in Herland could 
not have been, to Gilman in particular, more familiar—showing that even such 
men as these can be made to understand, indeed fall in love with, strong, 
independent, and eminently rational women. 
At first, all three of the tough-minded positivists found such women and the 
world they created forbidding and inhospitable. Gilman introduced Jeff, how-
ever, by noticing that he was "born to be a poet, a botanist—or both—but his folks 
persuaded him to be a doctor instead." While no more "'advanced' on the woman 
question" than the others, Jeff begins to take the women's side in the arguments 
Gilman staged to highlight the incommensurability of real and Utopian worldviews. 
The two men who remain steadfastly scientific and cynical see Jeff as "something 
of a traitor," as if "his medical knowledge gave him a different point of view 
somehow." Gilman, in short, made credible Jeffs conversion to the women's 
point of view—including his falling hopelessly in love and deciding to stay after 
the other two leave—by making him the same sort of humanitarian and practical 
scientist as was natural to Herland. As the narrator observes at the end, "I never 
saw an alien become naturalized more quickly than that man in Herland."24 
The narrator, Vandyck, proved a less willing convert. Pointedly, Gilman 
made him at once a social Darwinian sociologist and a dispenser of "learned" 
opinions confirming women's "physiological limitations." The key moment in 
Vandyck's conversion occurs as he confronts his "mixed feelings" for Ellador, 
the Herlander of whom he has become enamored. On the one hand, he enjoys the 
"restfullness" that attends his being treated "in a gentle motherly way;" on the 
other, his "hereditary instincts and race-traditions" make him long for a more 
"feminine response" to his desire. Gilman added a level of epistemological 
significance to the narrator's predicament by bringing him to this conclusion: 
"Here was I, with an Ideal in mind, for which I hotly longed, and here was she, 
deliberately obtruding in the foreground of my consciousness a Fact—a fact 
which I coolly enjoyed, but which actually interfered with what I wanted." 
Vandyck is quite clear that the biggest obstacle to his resolving this conundrum 
is "their confounded psychology." Having put psychology with "history" rather 
than with "personal life"—a move which thoroughly baffles the male positiv-
ists—the Herlanders are able to show that what the men took to be "physiological 
necessities" are in fact culture-specific "psychological necessities." Vandyck's 
ability to break the hot spell of the Ideal and at least warmly enjoy the Fact—fall 
in love with a cool, "de-feminized" Herlander—derives from two circumstances. 
First, the women of Herland have mastered psychology better than any other 
science, so as an especially skillful "practical psychologist" Ellador is able to 
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facilitate Vandyck' s change of heart. Second, Ellador gets assistance from a most 
unlikely source—"under all our cultivated attitude of mind toward women, there 
is an older, deeper, more 'natural' feeling, the restful reverence which looks up 
to the Mother sex." The declaration that dissolves the narrator's confusion, then, 
bridges both a rational and an emotional gap between the two worlds. When he 
announces "I'd rather have you with me—on your own terms—than not to have 
you," he sets in motion a marriage of the scientific and the just, the Fact and the 
Ideal, that Gilman arranged in neither her own life nor her sociological texts.25 
In light of the thesis I broached at the outset regarding the role gender might 
play in women's intellectual pursuits, it is significant that Gilman used an instinct 
(the "older, deeper, more 'natural' feeling" underlying "our cultivated attitude of 
mind") as catalyst for Vandyck's conversion. Instinct theory provided her male 
peers with explanations at once certifiably Darwinian and, applicable alike to the 
social and the natural world, sufficiently all-encompassing to satisfy positivist 
longings. Gilman, by contrast, argued explicitly in her sociological texts against 
attributing causal force to instincts in human development. She referred during 
discussions of motivation to various "impulses," but by choosing this word she 
effectively removed such discussions from the realm of readymade meanings 
prescribed by "instinct" talk. The reader who accesses "instinct" in the index of 
Women and Economics finds only one—the instinctive love of a mother for her 
offspring. Turning to the cited pages, one finds Gilman mainly engaged in 1) a 
restatement of Ward's thesis regarding the subordination within the human 
species of "instinct" to "intelligence," and 2) a debunking of the "Darwinian" 
concept ("maternal sacrifice") with which Vandyck's real life counterparts 
justified what they deemed women's necessary hence "natural" confinement to 
reproductive functions.26 
In Herland, however, the inbred reverence for the "Mother sex" that helped 
coerce Vandyck's renunciation of real world sexism carried tremendous analytic 
and political weight. Specifically, this "mother-love" constituted the bond of 
affection that united, in thought and action, every inhabitant of Herland.27 Much 
to the chagrin of the male intruders, who believed that it was "against nature" for 
women to cooperate, Herlanders were on every issue in total and voluntary 
agreement and in every situation impervious to jealousy or quarrelsome pettiness. 
To be sure, Gilman reversed the direction in which maternal affection flowed (in 
Herland, to rather than from the mother) and even in Utopia took pains to 
emphasize that the "mother-love" underlying communal unanimity was a "reli-
gion," not "a mere 'instinct'." Nonetheless, this sentiment performed the same 
analytic function that instincts executed in the arguments of male reform 
Darwinians—a primitive predisposition needing merely to be awakened by the 
touch of "modern" (in Gilman's case Utopian) conditions to become a material 
force for progress. If anything, Gilman's equation of "mother-love" with religion 
underscores again the ideological disjuncture between her sociological and 
Utopian reasoning: Herland religion is not that of Lyman or Henry Beecher, but 
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the cult of motherhood is as distant as her relatives' Protestantism from the 
emphatically secular stance of Women and Economics. Inconsistent alike with 
that text's disavowal of moralism and of instinct theory, the mawkish sentiment 
of "mother-love" guaranteed that the problem of credibility which haunted her 
sociological analysis of women's oppression would not appear in Herland. Mrs. 
Smith and Miss Jones, had they been the ones to chance upon Herland, could not 
possibly "react violently" to its reigning ideal of femininity—it is programmed 
into their genetic inheritance. In Utopia, where every person is a woman and every 
woman is "moved by precisely the same feelings, to the same end," the familiar 
is a holy place, built with analytic materials that in the real world Gilman refused 
to touch.28 
There are prisons in Herland, but no women prisoners. Gilman reserved the 
fate of involuntary confinement for Terry, the most ruggedly individualist and 
narrowly empiricist of the three and the only intruder to remain hostile to Herland 
and its inhabitants to the end. Where Jeff and Vandyck were drawn finally by 
mother-love into the circle of sisterhood, his steadfast commitment to the facts of 
real-world science rendered him incapable of seeing women as anything other 
than objects of desire. A "man's man" to the end, he tried to seduce the first 
Herlander he encountered by offering a cheap necklace as "bait" and, failing in 
that as in all subsequent seductions, complained thereafter that Herlanders were 
not "feminine" and lacked "charm." All three men eventually fall in love and 
marry, but for Terry the outcome is not Shakesperean. Far from restoring 
harmony to strained relations, the ceremony added to his determination to take his 
Herland mate, Alima, "by storm." The latter, bound by Herland cultural prescrip-
tions to suppress any expression of "sex-feeling," refuses to physically consum-
mate the marriage. Terry, loyal to the assumptions of his own culture, believes 
that "[t]here never was a woman yet that did not enjoy being mastered." Set on 
a collision course by contradictory, and finally incommensurable, conceptions of 
love and marriage, Terry and Alima come undone in a way that reveals dramati-
cally the gulf dividing the Utopian and the real: he attempts by "sheer brute force" 
to compel her submission but is instead forcibly subdued and imprisoned. Some 
Herlanders, Alima prominent among them, "wanted him killed" for this "unpar-
donable sin," but after a lengthy trial he is condemned only to immediate 
expulsion—back to a land where raping one's wife was not even a misde-
meanor.29 
Gilman lived and wrote in the world to which Terry was banished. However 
absurd or anti-social under Utopian conditions, Terry's conception of "woman's 
nature" remained the dominant one in turn-of-the-century America, a circum-
stance that constrained Gilman's efforts to construct a science-sanctioned alter-
native. In that world, the common sense credibility of Terry's feminine ideal 
continually thwarted her intention to promote the feminist ideals which in 
Herland commanded a consensual loyalty. Her aspiration to secure a scientific 
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guarantee for the eventual triumph of feminism ran aground on the stubborn fact 
Terry represented: the scientific community was still in 1915 a male domain and 
provided critical institutional and ideological support for the ideals Gilman 
wanted to undermine. More disheartening still, the next generation of rebellious 
women—the "flappers" of the 1920s—would look for inspiration not to science 
but to popular culture, adopting in the process an ideal of womanhood closer to 
Terry's than to Gilman's. Indeed, she had as muchreason to fear that Mrs. Smith's 
and Miss Jones' daughters would shun the asexual women of her Utopia, as then-
mothers would flee from the "over-sexed phantom" of her sociology. The image 
of the post-war Gilman—touting the same ideas even as her audience drifted 
away, castigating from the same Victorian standpoint women of the 1920s as 
"painted, powdered, high-heeled, cigarette-smoking idiots," bemoaning what by 
her own account were the "repeated failures" of her later years—is finally tragic 
in the classic sense: the necessary outcome of a flaw, present in her vision from 
the outset, which Gilman discerned but did not correct.30 
I invoke here a historical, not an existential, fate. The tenacity with which 
Gilman clung to positivist desiderata illuminates neither a psychological nor 
human condition but the predicament of women intellectuals in a man-made 
world. Where her male peers might stick to their positivist guns for professional 
or ideological reasons, she had little choice. Where they could with only cognitive 
discomfort switch their allegiance to some available alternative, she risked by that 
route her most heartfelt political ideals. Where they entered the realm of the 
purely imaginative with their realworld commitments in hand, she checked hers 
at the door, liberating by this act, time and space for testing alternatives to 
available methods—her own, most trusted sociological ones included—of achiev-
ing those ideals. 
My case for acknowledging the effects of gender in intellectual life by 
highlighting such extra constraints and double binds might best be summarized 
by considering Gilman's relationship to the alternative that appears, in retrospect, 
more compatible with her agenda than the old-style positivism to which she 
remained so fervently faithful. Pragmatism, after all, attracted many who had 
once consorted with Hegel, Comte, and Spencer and gained during the years 
spanned by Women and Economics and Herland considerable credibility among 
her radical compatriots. The Masses, voice of this new radicalism, was an early 
and outspoken advocate of the modern feminism with which Gilman is typically 
associated. More striking than these historical connections, Gilman actually 
created in Utopia a worldview that intersects at several key points with pragma-
tism, Dewey's version in particular. First, Herland scientific and political beliefs 
are practical, not theoretical, and communally, not individually, verified. Second, 
Dewey had a hand in the discovery—that psychology belonged with "history" 
rather than with "personal life," culture rather than biology—which underlay the 
distinctiveness of Herland social theory. Third, such headway as women made in 
the new, research universities resulted, in part, from the strategic assistance 
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offered by young professors like Dewey and Mead, real-world proponents of the 
kind of psychology Herlanders perfected.31 Finally, and in this case more akin to 
James than Dewey, Gilman treats science itself as if it were just another prejudice, 
fully as capable of leading one astray as of guiding one to the brutely given. 
Outside Utopia, however, Gilman remained deaf to what many of her 
contemporaries deemed the appeals of pragmatism. If sexism is consensual, as it 
surely was in all but a remote corner of Gilman's world, egalitarian truths require 
a more secure ground than is provided by either expert or public opinion. To a 
feminist in Progressive Era America, adopting an intersubjective position on truth 
meant trading the impartial rule of physical "Law" for the complicit authority of 
men like Jeff, Vandyck, and Terry. Routing scientific arguments along a path of 
cultural rather than natural facts meant subjecting the scientist to the blind, if 
benign, tyranny of Mrs. Smith and Miss Jones. Gilman practiced these pragmatist 
maneuvers only in the safety of a community and a culture she herself created. 
Unable, as sociologist or activist, to stay long in this shelter, she armed herself 
with the remarkable laws and patent facts of positivism—all rendered certain by 
their analagous relationship to the laws and facts of Darwinian biology but none 
capable of generating even a concept of culture, let alone a blueprint for the just 
world Gilman desired—and returned home. Wedded to nineteenth-century 
conceptions of science and sexuality, Gilman never crossed the conceptual border 
into the modern.32 Her desire to "know surely," however far it took her from the 
familiar aspirations of Mrs. Smith and Miss Jones or their daughters, confined her 
more narrowly than she realized to the sphere inhabited by her own family of 
believers. Science as Gilman understood it was finally as inhibiting, and as 
ineffective a remedy for the "sorrows and perplexities" of women, as the religion 
she claimed to have renounced. An ideological affinity thus strengthened the 
marriage of convenience that, before 1920, enabled fact-citing feminists and 
Bible-quoting reformers to work together as suffragists and, after that marriage 
dissolved, rendered both partners equally unattractive to the free spirits of the jazz 
age. 
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participating members in the community that, by pragmatist lights, validates truth claims and 
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historical interpretations. We might also expect, during times when a social movement is successfully 
challenging traditional notions of gender, a narrowing of the gap between the Utopian worlds that 
women create and their actual experience, something I would suggest is discernible, for example, in 
the relationship between the world Marge Piercy imagines in Woman on the Edge of Time (New York, 
1976) and the experience of radical feminists after 1968. 
32. In this conclusion, I echo the central theme of Cotkin, Reluctant Modernism—see, in 
particular, 96-100, 152-154. 
